Mine sign, Ukraine, June 2022.
Image courtesy of The HALO Trust.

investigations, HALO is leading this effort and has been able to
assess and map EO contamination across Ukraine for humanitarian end-purposes, allowing HALO staff working in Ukraine
to better plan and conduct survey and clearance operations as
well as EORE across the country.
HALO has been working in Ukraine since the end of 2015 in
the government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.
Over seven years, HALO teams conducted non-technical survey
(NTS), clearance, and risk education throughout the region, particularly along the contact line that existed until February 2022.
Russia’s full-scale invasion in February temporarily brought survey and clearance work to a halt, while staff focused on moving
their families to safety in the west of the country and assisted with
aid distribution, risk education, and first aid training. The Russian

withdrawal from Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy oblasts by early April
2022 provided a window for operations to resume safely and
HALO relocated its operations to a base just outside Kyiv to be
able to work in these three regions. Despite the uncertainty during the initial stages of the war before the partial Russian withdrawal, HALO wanted to be fully prepared for future operations
and began using a “remote” approach to understand the type
of EO used and the scale and impact of contamination within
Ukraine. This article explains the path HALO has taken to track
EO and explosive remnants of war (ERW) across Ukraine online
using open-source research and mapping techniques. Such wellstructured open-source research based on social media is becoming an increasingly important part of the desk assessment phase
and contextual information required for NTS.2

The Context in Ukraine

OPEN-SOURCE RESEARCH AND MAPPING OF

EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE
CONTAMINATION IN UKRAINE
By Andro Mathewson [ The HALO Trust ]

D

ue to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the scale of explosive ordnance (EO) contamination
in Ukraine has reached unprecedented levels, necessitating new methods to assess and track
the different types of ordnance and the level of contamination across the country. As the most
documented, active war on social media to date, The HALO Trust (HALO) has successfully harnessed
open-source research to better plan and conduct survey, clearance operations, and explosive ordnance
risk education (EORE) across the country.
Russian’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which began in February
2022, has become “the first open-source war,” where almost every
aspect of the conflict on the ground has an online counterpart—
from logistics and guidance systems to humanitarian aid delivery
and conflict mapping.1 As the transport of supplies occurs on the
ground, the plans thereof are drafted online. As the soldiers adjust
the guidance systems of their weaponry on the frontlines, engineers online are solving issues that arise. As humanitarian aid is
being delivered across Ukraine, teams of analysts are crunching
data to prioritize the regions with the highest need. As the conflict
progresses and frontlines move, researchers are mapping the conflict and its devastating effects on Ukraine, including the EO that is
left behind in areas where the fighting has subsided.
The scale of EO contamination in Ukraine has reached
unprecedented levels, necessitating new methods to assess and
track the different types of EO and the level of EO contamination
across Europe’s largest country due to its inaccessibility to organizations working in-country as a result of the ongoing conf lict.
Harnessing open-source research, satellite imagery, and online
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TM-62M, first landmine found from latest war
in Ukraine, 2022.
Image courtesy of HALO.

By mid-July, Russia occupied approximately 126,610
square kilometers of Ukrainian territory, 3 almost
twenty-one percent of the entire country, including
areas in the east, south, and the Crimean Peninsula.
Since the full-scale invasion started on 24 February
2022, the conflict has seen more than an estimated
100,000 deaths of soldiers on both sides, foreign volunteers, and civilians.4 During the initial stages of the war
in February and March 2022, Russian troops moved
swiftly across northern, eastern, and southern Ukraine,
encircling cities such as Kharkiv, Kyiv, and Mariupol.
By April, Russian forces had retreated or been pushed
back from most newly occupied areas, except along
Ukraine’s southern coast reaching Kherson in the west
and large parts of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, and
Zaporizhia Oblasts, creating a frontline of approximately 2,000 kilometers long.
As with all conflicts that involve conventional military technologies and tactics, such as the use of heavy
artillery and anti-personnel and anti-tank landmines
for area denial, the war in Ukraine has led to vast
amounts of EO contamination across the country, leaving civilians directly at risk. However, the situation is
worsened by the indiscriminate use of cluster munitions and the presence of kicked-out munitions from
destroyed military vehicles and ammunition depots,
which also pose a threat to civilian bystanders. Understanding these different threats to civilians and the
location of EO contamination is critical to effective and
efficient humanitarian demining operations.
Figure 1. Assessed control of terrain in
Ukraine as of 20 July 2022, 3:00 p.m. ET. ©
2022. Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and
American Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats
Project made possible by the Dr. Jack London
Geospatial Fund at ISW.
Figure courtesy of ISW.
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MRV-U impact fuzes for
grad system.
Image courtesy of HALO.

9N255 cluster submunition in Ukraine, June 2022.
Image courtesy of HALO.

Defining Open-Source Research
Open-source research is the process of collecting and analyzing
legally gathered information from publicly available sources only,
without the use of clandestine collection techniques and containing no information from private or classified sources. Open-source
research can be conducted in a variety of ways depending on the
scenario, information desired, and availability. In simple terms,

Risk education, Ukraine, 2022.
Image courtesy of HALO.
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it revolves around the collection of information, predominantly
online but also via verbal or written communication, with the
end goal of analyzing the collected data to extrapolate an analysis.
Depending on the situation, the analysis can be used to inform the
public about an important topic, advise public and national policies, or inspire a call to action.
While open-source research is frequently used in national
security and law enforcement, with the expansion of the internet,
smartphones, and social media, it has become an accessible tool
used by non-governmental organizations and individuals alike.5
Since the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011 and the conflict in
eastern Ukraine in 2014, open-source research has also become a
constant of modern warfare, helping to thin out the fog of war.6
Many global organizations use open-source information, including the United Nations, to support peacekeeping operations and
plan the delivery of aid during times of crisis or disaster. The war
in Ukraine is by far the most active conflict on social media of all
time, consequently allowing HALO to leverage the high volume
of information using open-source research for the collection and
analysis of data on EO contamination in Ukraine. This in turn has
enabled HALO to better plan and conduct operations and carry
out EORE activities more efficiently and effectively. This includes
determining the priorities for the deployment of NTS and clearance teams, to informing the procurement of the most appropriate
equipment for the expected threat.

Lipivka minefield clearance, Ukraine, 2022.
Image courtesy of HALO.

HALO’s Approach to Open-Source Research
HALO has previously used open-source research for a smallscale project in Tripoli, Libya, where researchers focused on
social media posts that were sharing photos and videos, indicating evidence of landmines and improved explosive devices. The
exact locations of contamination finds were then placed on a map
alongside the frontlines of the 2018 battle for Tripoli (see Figure
2). Plotting the locations of unexploded ordnance and battlefield
frontlines enabled HALO to prepare for NTS—the process of identifying and marking suspected and confirmed hazardous areas—
and prioritize areas with high levels of contamination and high
levels of human activity. Since March 2022, this approach has been
successfully applied to and expanded in the Ukraine context.
HALO’s current open-source research methodology includes
five central stages, as outlined in Table 1.

Historical Frontline in Greater Tripoli
Analysis of Different Dates

Tripoli

Tajoura
Hai Alandalus

Suq Aljumaa
Abusliem

Janzour
Ain Zara

Legend
Evidence of ERW
Landmines Identified
Landmine Accidents
June 20th (beginning of
Frontline Positioning)

December 31, 2019

Figure 2. Historical frontlines and ERW
locations in the greater Tripoli area.
Figure courtesy of HALO.

May 21, 2020 (Furthest
Advancement of LNA)

May 31, 2020 (LNA’s
final withdrawal)
Area of Potential Highest
Contamination

Adminstrative
Boundaries
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No. Research Stage

Ukraine Context

1.

Determining end goals and
focus of research

Map the EO contamination in Ukraine due to the Russian invasion, including the
location of civilian accidents due to ERW (see objectives in Table 2)

2.

Identify sources

Social media (Telegram, Twitter, and Facebook), traditional media (Ukrainian and
international news outlets), think tank reports, and research organizations (Live
Universal Awareness Map and Armed Conflict Location Event Database (ACLED))

3.

Conduct searches online

Conduct deep-dive searches through online media for relevant events within set
objectives (see Table 2)

4

Verify/geolocate events

Use verification and geolocation techniques to ascertain the veracity of reports
and identify the precise location of events

5.

Mapping, collation, and analysis Extrapolate information from the data to inform HALO’s survey, planning,
of data
clearance operations, and EORE delivery

Table 1. HALO’s open-source research methodology.
Table courtesy of HALO.

The first of these stages, determining the end goals and the focus of research, resulted in the identification of thirteen objectives with
different purposes as outlined in Table 2.
Objectives/Categories

Purpose

Track the movement of frontlines

To locate areas with a high likelihood of EO contamination

Track areas of prolonged fighting

Provides evidence points for future NTS teams to investigate

Identify locations of cluster munition
strikes

Provides evidence points for future NTS teams to investigate

Identify locations of any EO

Provides evidence points for future NTS teams to investigate

Identify locations of destroyed military
vehicles

Provides evidence points for future NTS teams to investigate

Identify locations of air and missile
strikes

Provides evidence points for future NTS teams to investigate

Identify all types of EO used in the
conflict

Tailor EORE campaign and materials for items found in the region; Tailor
explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) training ID guides; identify suitable
procedures and EOD tools; inform all HMA actors of what to expect in the
region; inform procurement of machines and detectors

Identify areas of landmine/improvised
exposive device contamination

Provides evidence point for future NTS teams to investigate; information can
be shared with other humanitarian actors enabling safer delivery of humanitarian aid

Identify any strikes on ammunition
storage facilities

Provides evidence points for future NTS teams to investigate

Identify vehicles and weapon systems
used in the conflict

Assists in defining what type of munitions could be used by these platforms,
which then helps with EO recognition

Identify the location of civilian
accidents and the number of
casualties from UXO

Monitor the number of civilian casualties due to UXO; report this figure to other
humanitarian actors; assist in planning or provision of victim assistance activities

Identify destroyed infrastructure

Critical information for wider humanitarian effort

Understand the causes of non-HMA
demining accidents reported in the
media

Provides evidence point for future NTS teams to investigate; assists in defining
potential hazards to deminers in HMA.

Tank rounds,
Ukraine, 2022.

Image courtesy of HALO.

The second step involves identifying publicly available sources
to procure information. The majority of HALO’s information
stems from social media platforms, primarily Twitter, Telegram,
and Facebook, but also Reddit and YouTube. HALO uses advanced
search techniques such as boolean logic searches to filter content
and find images and videos about the aforementioned categories.
Another large source of information is local Ukrainian news and
media outlets, such as Suspline Media, Unian, and RBC-Ukraine,
as well as official press releases of Ukrainian local police forces or
government officials. Finally, HALO also utilizes publicly available
pre-collated databases with pertinent information, such as those by
Live Universal Awareness Map, ACLED, the Center for Information
Resilience, and volunteer groups, such as Geoconfirmed.
The third step of HALO’s open-source research project is verifying the data that is discovered using the different sources previously mentioned. HALO follows a four-step verification process.
This begins with assessing the originality of the image or video in

question. If the image or the video was used before, it is frequently
possible to trace it back to the original online posting via a reverse
image and/or video search. There are a multitude of different tools
online that allow such searches and will show if an image has been
posted before the current post. This helps to minimize false claims
of EO items apparently found in Ukraine, which might actually
stem from other conflicts. After determining the originality of the
content, the reliability of the source is assessed on a scale of low,
medium, or high reliability. If the information stems from official
Ukrainian government sources, a well-recognized media outlet,
or social media account and can be corroborated by at least one
other source, it is classified as “highly reliable.” If it cannot be corroborated by other sources, it falls under the “medium reliability”
category. The previous two categories are added to HALO’s database and map, which is shared with other actors in the humanitarian mine action (HMA) sector. If it stems from a previously
unknown source and provides little detail, it is classified under
the “low reliability” category and not included in our public-facing
datasets until it can be verified. The third step in the verification
process is geolocating the image. Geolocation is the identification
of the geographic location of an object in an image via a variety
of data collection mechanisms, such as satellite imagery and GPS
metadata. However, HALO only uses satellite imagery and other
mapping tools to geolocate source material, as metadata is often
sensitive and has restricted access. The geolocation of an image
not only helps to ascertain the veracity of the content (e.g., does it
depict an event within Ukraine or is it from another conflict), but it
also facilitates HALO to create a detailed map depicting all events
Figure 3. HALO’s conflict and contamination map as of
26 September 2022. Each dot corresonds to a unique
event involving EO and the colors represent a different
category based on HALO’s project objectives.
Figure courtesy of HALO.

Table 2. Identified objectives.
Table courtesy of HALO.
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discovered by open-source research, creating a portrait of the conflict in Ukraine, as shown in Figure 3.7
This enables HALO to plot areas with high EO contamination
(according to the previously mentioned objectives) and overlaps
them with areas of high human activity, such as densely populated areas or farmland. This subsequently allows HALO to prioritize different survey, clearance, and EORE tasks. The final step of
the verification process is assessing when the image or video was
posted online. If it was posted before the annexation of Crimea
and the occupation of the eastern reaches of Luhansk and Donetsk
Oblast in 2014, the content definitively does not portray (new) EO

in Ukraine.8 If an image is posted post–2014, it increases the likelihood that it accurately depicts ERW in Ukraine.
The last stage of the open-source research process is to collate
and analyze the data, which allows for the production of several
different outputs, all of which help to inform either HALO’s operations or HALO’s donors and other humanitarian organizations. At
the time of publication, HALO has gathered and verified 20,000
unique events, within the thirteen categories previously mentioned, showing the location of each event, including 196 accidents involving civilians (112 deceased and 257 injured).9 These are
depicted in Figure 4.

Ordnance Type
Figure 4. HALO’s dashboard showing data gathered onCasualties
civilianbyaccidents
due to UXO in Ukraine.

Figure courtesy of HALO.
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Figure 5. Casualties by activity (left);
casualties by EO type (right).
Figure courtesy of HALO.

Anti-tank mine strike,
LADA Nova, Ukraine, 2022.

Image courtesy of HALO.

HALO’s research has also identified 400 unique types of EO
used in the conflict, primarily Russian or Soviet-made munitions
but also many Western designs. HALO does not currently track
different types of small arms and light weapons (SA/LW). However,
the tracking of SA/LW represents a potential area of expansion
for the project, especially to focus on Man Portable Air Defense
Systems (MANPADS), which have been used extensively throughout the war. The knowledge accumulated through open-source
research has allowed HALO to understand the EO contamination of Ukraine in-depth and has aided in the planning of areas
of operations, prioritization of tasks, training of staff, equipment
purchases, and risk education activities.
An example of HALO’s open-source research leading to clearance operations is one of HALO’s tasks in the region east of Kyiv,
near the village of Hoholiv. On 5 April 2022, a tractor hit an
anti-vehicle mine, resulting in the injury of the driver. This was
reported in the local newspaper, the Brovary Tribune.10 The site
of this accident subsequently became one of HALO’s first clearance tasks after the Russian withdrawal from Kyiv Oblast earlier
that month, which allowed HALO to safely resume operations
in the region.

While incredibly valuable to HALO, open-source research does
come with its own set of unique challenges. One of the major challenges is the impossibility to collect all information on EO contamination across Ukraine. While the level of detail in reporting
of the conflict is immense (to the level that it creates the issue of
informational overload), there will be explosive events that remain
unreported due to the fog of war and the immensity of the scale of
Ukraine and the war itself. Additionally, the complete verification
and precise geolocation of data is sometimes impossible, either due
to the presence of misinformation or the lack of sufficient information associated with the imagery or in the image itself. Another
challenge is the size of resultant datasets, numbering in the tens of
thousands, which require cleaning while each data point requires
verification.
A final challenge faced by HALO in conducting open-source
research is the policies of many social media companies that
remove content due to its graphic nature before HALO can access
and archive it for verification and geolocation. Despite these issues,
however, HALO’s open-source research and mapping project has
shown promise in helping to understand the progression of the
conflict and its resultant effects on Ukraine.

300m 9M55 rocket, Ukraine, 2022.
Image courtesy of HALO.
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Moving Forward and Wider Use
NTS team, Ukraine, June 2022.

Image courtesy of HALO.

Moving forward, HALO is looking to expand the scope of tools
used in this project to reduce the amount of manual labor needed for
the data processing aspects of the research. This potentially includes
leveraging artificial intelligence to assist with both internet scraping and data cleaning tasks although these tools must be designed to
work with original source data in Ukrainian and Russian to minimize the chance that any details are lost in translation.

Anti-tank mine strike near
Hoholi, Ukraine.
Image courtesy of HALO.

Limitations of Open-Source Data
Both social media and news media tend to emphasize the new
and unusual. For example, there has been extensive coverage of the
use of the POM-3 scatterable mine and improvised munitions such
as drink cans with explosives dropped by altered commercial offthe-shelf drones. Yet, the frequency of news reports does not match
their prevalence on the ground, nor their impact on civilians.

Casualty data from open-source reporting, followed by the work
of HALO’s NTS and clearance teams, so far demonstrates that
anti-vehicle mines—primarily the TM-62M variant—are causing
the majority of accidents with the highest number of casualties.
Clearing the land of anti-vehicle mines is subsequently where the
bulk of HMA resources will need to be committed.

As time progresses, HALO will begin to evaluate the effectiveness of the project, with a special focus on understanding its use for
targeted EORE activities and assessing what proportion of recorded
events have resulted in the subsequent creation of suspected hazardous areas or confirmed hazardous areas once followed up by
NTS teams on the ground. Importantly, the use of such opensource research techniques is easily transferable to other locations
and projects within the HMA sector and beyond, especially where
in-country access is restricted for whatever reason or there is a lack
of data regarding EO used in the conflict and the resultant contamination. The ability to conduct in-depth research online allows
organizations like HALO to have a detailed understanding of the
conflict even before stepping on the ground.
See endnotes page 105

HALO deminer, Kyiv Oblast, June 2022.
Image courtesy of HALO.

Andro Mathewson
Research Officer
The HALO Trust

Armoured personnel carrier strike near
highway and playground, Ukraine, 2022.
Image courtesy of HALO.
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